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MAGNA CARTA AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 
FAMILY PROCEEDINGS  
 
The Hon Mr Justice Mostyn  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We had a surprise in January 2012 when a practising QC was 
parachuted straight into the Supreme Court (as the Judicial Committee of 
the House of Lords became in 2009). But if there were expressions of 
discontent they were definitely sub rosa since the man in question, 
Jonathan Sumption QC, was then, and has since proved himself to be, pre-
eminently qualified for the position. He is one of our foremost medieval 
historians, a Fellow of Magdalen College who taught History, before 
leaving to pursue a career at the Bar, where he rose to dizzy heights. His 
as yet uncompleted history of the Hundred Years‟ War has received the 
highest praise. So it perhaps was not surprising that in this octocentenial 
year he should have been asked by the Friends of the British Library (an 
audience I warrant as challenging as this) to speak to them about Magna 
Carta on 9 March 2015. If I may say so, his address “Magna Carta then 
and now”1 is a masterpiece. It completes the destruction of the 
hermeneutical myth originated by Sir Edward Coke which had been 
commenced by William McKechnie in his landmark essay published in 
1905. 
In his speech Lord Sumption began by saying: 
 
“It is impossible to say anything new about Magna Carta, unless 
you say something mad. In fact, even if you say something mad, 
the likelihood is that it will have been said before, probably quite 
recently.” 
 
                                                     
 Lecture delivered to the National Access to Justice and Pro Bono Conference, 
Sydney 18-19 June 2015. 
 The Hon Mr Justice Mostyn, Judge of the High Court of Justice, Family 
Division. 
1
 Lord Sumption, „Magna Carta Then and Now‟ (Supreme Court, 9 March 2015) 
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-150309.pdf> accessed 26 August 2015. 
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I will not presume to say anything new about Magna Carta. In fact my 
principal subject matter – the withdrawal of legal aid from private law 
family cases – has nothing to do with Magna Carta except in the extended 
mythic sense with which Sir Edward Coke and others have since clothed 
it. Indeed I am supremely unqualified to talk about it. Until comparatively 
recently my knowledge of it was confined to my childhood reading. At 
age six I read the Nursery History of England
2
 which told me that: 
 
“THE SIGNING OF THE GREAT CHARTER 
 
At last all the people in the country were so angry with John that 
the chief men-said they would fight against him if he did not 
promise to do better. The new archbishop, Stephen Langton, was 
very anxious to make the king better to his people. At last they 
wrote down a great many promises, and they made John say he 
would keep them, and he had to put a mark under the writing to 
show that it was a solemn promise. 
 
King John never meant to keep his promises, and after he had 
signed the “Great Charter,” as the writing was called, he threw 
himself upon the ground and kicked and groaned in anger. He died 
soon afterwards.” 
 
At age 10 I read (and have regularly re-read) that magnificent piece of 
nonsense 1066 And All That.
3
 This is what it told me: 
 
“the Barons compelled John to sign the Magna Charter, which 
said: 
 
1. That no one was to be put to death, save for some reason –
(except the Common People). 
 
2. That everyone should be free - (except the Common People). 
 
3. That everything should be of the same weight and measure 
throughout the Realm - (except the Common People). 
 
                                                     
2
 Elizabeth O‟Neill, Nursery History of England (TC and EC Jack Ltd 1877). 
3
 W Sellar and R Yeatman, 1066 And All That (Methuen and Co 1930). 
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4. That the Courts should be stationary, instead of following a very 
tiresome medieval official known as the King‟s Person all over the 
country. 
 
5. That “no person should be fined to his utter ruin” - (except the 
King‟s Person). 
 
6. That the Barons should not be tried except by a special jury of 
other Barons who would understand. 
 
Magna Charter was therefore the chief cause of Democracy in 
England, and thus a Good Thing for everyone (except the 
Common People). 
 
After this King John hadn‟t a leg to stand on and was therefore 
known as „John Lackshanks.‟” 
 
As we will see, this was a remarkably perceptive analysis of the 
Charter. The authors had earlier referred to Pope Innocent III thus: 
 
“John was so bad that the Pope decided to put the whole country 
under an Interdict, i.e. he gave orders that no one was to be born or 
die or marry (except in Church porches). But John was still not 
cured of his Badness; so the Pope sent a Bull to England to 
excommunicate John himself. In spite of the King‟s efforts to 
prevent it the Bull succeeded in landing and gave orders that John 
himself was not to be born or marry or die (except in Church 
porches); that no one was to obey him or stand him a drink or tell 
him the right time or the answer to the Irish Question or anything 
nice. So at last John gave way and he and his subjects began once 
more to be born and to marry and to die, etc. etc.” 
 
And we all know that this same Bullish Pope annulled the Charter 
within 10 weeks of John sealing it. He denounced it as “not only 
shameful and base but illegal and unjust”. 
For the purposes of this address I have consulted a number of sources. 
Among many others I have read Sir Matthew Hale‟s History of the 
Common Law of England (published posthumously in 1716 – he died in 
1676); Sir William Blackstone‟s Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(12th edition, 1795 – he died in 1780); and Sir William Holdsworth‟s A 
History of English Law (3rd edition 1922) to see what past commentators, 
other than the hierarch Sir Edward Coke, had to say about the Charter. 
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For Hale the only true source of law was that made by the judges, the 
common law. He seemed to regard Royal Charters or Acts of Parliament 
as little better than distractions from the true development of the law at the 
hands and minds of the judges. And who am I to criticise that? Inasmuch 
as praise was to be bestowed on John‟s royal laws, Hale seems more 
impressed by what he described as laws which allowed “Mulcts [to be] 
imposed for barbarous and disorderly Pleading” he observing that at that 
time “Proceedings in his courts were rude, imperfect and defective to what 
they were in the ensuing time of Edward I”. However, he did go this far: 
 
“But the Great Charter, and the Charter of the Forest, did not 
expire so; for in 1253, they were again sealed and published: And 
because after the Battle of Evesham, the King had wholly subdued 
the Barons, and thereby a Jealousie might grow, that he again 
meant to infringe it; in the Parliament at Marlbridge they are again 
confirm‟d. And thus we have the great Settlement of the Laws and 
Liberties of the Kingdom established in this King‟s time (he 
means Henry III): the Charters themselves are not every Word the 
same with those of King John, but they differ very little in 
Substance. 
 
This Great Charter and the Charta de Foresta was the great Basis 
upon which this Settlement of the English laws stood in this King 
and his Son; there were also additional Laws of this King yet 
extant which much polished the Common Law viz The Statutes of 
Merton and Marlbridge, and some others.” 
 
Blackstone acknowledges that the first source of the absolute rights of 
every Englishman is “the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, 
sword in hand, from King John, and afterwards, with some alterations, 
confirmed in Parliament by King Henry III his son.” However, he goes on 
to say: 
 
“Which charter contained very few new grants; but as Sir Edward 
Coke observes, was for the most part declaratory of the principal 
grounds of the fundamental laws of England.” 
 
As far as Blackstone was concerned the real hero in the promulgation 
and securing of these rights was Edward I, who he wrote “hath justly been 
stiled our English Justinian”. He passed a statute in 1297 (25 Edw I, c1) 
entitled “Confirmatio Cartarum de Libertatibus Angliæ et Forest” which 
stated that “the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; 
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all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are to be sent to 
all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to the people….”. It 
threatened excommunication to those who denounced it.
4
 His grandson 
Edward III went further and in his reign in 1369 Parliament (which had 
arrived as a recognisable body in 1258 – the earliest Statute Roll begins in 
1278 and the earliest Parliamentary Roll is of the year 1290) passed a 
statute that rendered void any statute which infringed its provisions (42 
Edw III, c1). It stated: “that the great Charter and the Charter of the Forest 
be holden and kept in all points; and that if there be any Statute made to 
the contrary, it shall be holden for none”. Which was perhaps the nearest 
we ever got to an entrenched constitution. 
At all events the Charter was confirmed and reissued by Henry III in 
1225 in a revised form (9 Hen III), and, as we have seen, entered the 
Statute Roll in 1297 (25 Edw I, c1).
5
 And of this sections 1 (Confirmation 
of Liberties), 9 (Liberties of London, &c), and 29 (Imprisonment &c 
contrary to Law. Administration of Justice) remain in force. (This latter 
clause, the most famous of all, was divided between the thirty-ninth and 
fortieth clauses in the version sealed by John). In all it was confirmed 
some thirty times in the Middle Ages. 
You will have noticed my references to the parallel Charter of the 
Forest.
6
 This mitigated and regulated the laws concerning hunting in the 
forest. Blackstone explained the context: 
 
“Richard the first, a brave and magnanimous prince, was a 
sportsman as well as a soldier; and therefore enforced the forest 
                                                     
4
 Henry III in 1253 threatened excommunication against all who took even the 
humblest part in infringing or altering its clauses: clam vel palam facto, verbo, vel 
consilio. 
5
 The original of this copy of the Charter hangs in Parliament House in Canberra. 
The mother of a friend of mine found another 1297 copy in her attic at Deene 
Park in Northamptonshire in the 1970s. They had no idea how it got there. It 
appears to have been at Deene Park from at least the early 1600s. Only 17 copies 
of the charter from the 13th century are known to survive; the Brudenells‟ 
example was the only one in private hands, and one of only five still carrying a 
royal seal. In 1983 it was sold privately to Ross Perot. It was sold again in 
December 2007 for more than US$21 million, and is on display in the National 
Archives in Washington, DC, alongside the Declaration of Independence and the 
United States Constitution: see „Marian Brudenell‟ (The Telegraph, 6 September 
2013) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/10292398/Marian-Brudenell.html> 
accessed 26 August 2015. 
6
 This was originally part of the Charter sealed in 1215 but was separated out into 
its own berth in 1217 after the death of John in 1216. 
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laws with some vigour; which occasioned many discontents 
among his people, though he repealed the penalties of castration, 
loss of eyes, and cutting off of hands and feet, before inflicted on 
such as transgressed, in hunting; probably finding that their 
severity prevented prosecutions.” 
 
I have not researched what the new penalties were but I suspect they 
were more severe than those prescribed in the Hunting Act 2004 (which 
banned the hunting of (some but not all) mammals with (more than two) 
“dogs” (but not by any other means)).7 
Holdsworth supplies some fascinating historical context. He bases 
many of his views on McKechnie‟s essay, which is, plainly a, if not the, 
prime source for students of the Charter. He explains how this particular 
charter of liberties can be traced back, through the charters of liberties 
granted by Henry II, Stephen and Henry I on their coronations, to King 
Cnut‟s charter of liberties. Cnut‟s charter is the direct linear ancestor of 
Magna Carta. So Magna Carta was not brand new; and was certainly not 
the bombshell that the later myth-makers have made it out to be. 
However, it did mark a watershed, at least up to a point. Holdsworth‟s 
view was this: 
 
“though, therefore, we can trace its form back to Anglo-Saxon 
times, though we can trace the genesis of some of its clauses to 
that charter of Henry I which Stephen Langton brought to the 
notice of the barons as a precedent for the demands which they 
were about to make upon the king, the Great Charter differs 
fundamentally from any preceding charter in the manner in which 
it was secured, in its contents, and in its historical importance. It 
was secured by a combination of the landowners, the church, and 
the merchants; and therefore it contained clauses dealing 
specifically with their particular grievances. Since the time when 
the charter of Henry I had been issued, a centralized administrative 
and judicial system had been created and elaborated. The Charter 
therefore necessarily contained many clauses which related to the 
working of that system. The granting of the Charter, and the 
success of the barons in maintaining it, opened a new chapter in 
                                                     
7
 In order to force through this vitally important piece of legislation the Blair 
Government required Parliament to spend over 700 hours debating the issue 
(more than 10 times it spent discussing the Iraq war) and had to invoke the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 to override the House of Lords for only the fourth 
time since 1949. 
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English history, which ended by establishing a system of 
constitutional government, of which the Charter was regarded as 
the pledge and the symbol.” 
 
Lord Bingham, in his essay Magna Carta
8
 goes even further in the 
direction of the hagiographers. He writes: 
 
“Conditioned as we are today by our own knowledge of political 
and constitutional development over the last nine centuries, it calls 
for the exercise of real historical imagination to appreciate the 
enormity, the grandeur of what was done at Runnymede. King 
John entered the meadow as a ruler acknowledging no secular 
superior, whose word was law. He left the meadow as a ruler who 
had acknowledged, in the most solemn manner imaginable, that 
there were some things even he could not do, at any rate without 
breaking his promise. This, then, is the enduring legacy of Magna 
Carta: the lesson that no power is absolute; that all power, 
however elevated, is subject to constraint; that, as was to be said 
by Dr Thomas Fuller some centuries later, „Be you never so high, 
the law is above you‟.” 
 
Needless to say, Lord Sumption douses these views with cold water. 
He explains pitilessly that it is not true that Magna Carta was the origin of 
the principle of the rule of law. The English Kings had broken the law 
quite frequently before Magna Carta, and they continued to break it 
afterwards. But the idea that the King was subject to law had for a very 
long time been part of the orthodoxy of medieval constitutional thought 
both in England and elsewhere. The barons did not invent it at 
Runnymede. Their object was to define what the law was. No one doubted 
that whatever it was, the King was subject to it. 
One thing is certain. The Charter did not benefit the common people 
one whit, and Sellar and Yeatman were quite right when they wrote their 
amusement in 1930. Although Coke attempted to argue that the famous 
clause 39 extended to all people it is clear that this was not so.
9
 As 
Holdsworth explains: 
                                                     
8
 Tom Bingham, Lives of the Law (OUP 2011). 
9
 Blackstone also commits the same solecism writing that “it protected every 
individual of the nation in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty, and his 
property, unless declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers or the law of 
the land”. In a footnote he references chapter 29 of the Charter which is of course 
not the same as clause 39 of the version sealed by John (q.v.). 
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“It does not legislate for Englishmen generally, but attempts to 
safeguard the rights of different classes according to their different 
needs. Churchmen, lords, tenants, and merchants are separately 
provided for. But there are some clauses of the Charter, notably 
the famous section 39, in which rights are conferred upon all 
„liberi homines.‟ The phrase liberi homines is clearly not confined 
to tenants in chief; but did it include the villeins, or were they 
excluded from the benefits conferred? … It is fairly certain that 
they were not considered to be thus included in 1215. It is true that 
they seem to be provided for in section 20, which provides that a 
villein shall be amerced „saving his contenement and his wainage.‟ 
But it is fairly clear that they were thus protected, not because it 
was intended to confer any rights upon them, but because they 
were the property of their lords, and excessive amercements would 
diminish their value. When the Charter was reissued in 1216, this 
intention was made quite clear by a slight alteration in wording. It 
was provided that a villein other than the king‟s villein was not to 
be thus amerced. Thus, although the Charter was comprehensive 
in its scope it did not embrace all Englishmen.” 
 
In her excellent speech in 2011 entitled “Equal Access to Justice in the 
Big Society” Lady Hale put it more pithily: “I doubt whether the medieval 
barons gave any thought to the poor and vulnerable in their society, still 
less to the women”. 
It was not until the statute of Edward III in 1331 (5 Edw III, c9) that 
clause 39 of the 1215 version (clause 29 of the version of 1225) was 
extended to all men whatever their status. And it was not until 1354 (28 
Edw III, c3) that “due process”10 was formally extended to all men. 
Whatever Magna Carta was, it was not a Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
Clause 40 of the 1215 Charter famously provides that “we will sell to 
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right”.11 
Again, as Lord Sumption explains, the notion that the proscription on 
“selling” justice means that the state is obliged to provide free justice is 
                                                     
10
 “No Man, of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or 
Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor be put to Death, 
without being brought in Answer by due Process of Law”. So far as I can tell this 
is the origin of the mystical phrase “due process of law”. The original Norman 
French is “saunz estre mesne en respons par due proces de lei”. 
11
 Now part of clause 29 of the 1225 Charter in force. 
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much misunderstood. At the time the King had a personal judicial 
jurisdiction over his “tenants-in-chief”, essentially the baronage and the 
richer knights. He had a habit of adjudicating disputes personally rather 
than delegating them to his justices. And he demanded large sums, known 
as “proffers”, for access to his court. This is what clause 40 was aimed at. 
For run-of-the-mill litigants access to the general courts required payment 
of fees for writs and subpoenas. Clause 40 did not affect these fees one 
jot. 
In 1495, during the reign of Henry VII, Parliament passed a statute (11 
Hen 7, c12) “to admit such persons as are poor to sue in Forma 
Pauperis”.12 This provided that every poor person might issue “Writ or 
Writs Original and Writs of Subpoena … nothing paying to your Highness 
for the Seals of the same, nor to any Person for the writing of the same” 
and that the Justices “shall assign to the same poor Person … Counsel 
learned, by their Discretions, which shall give their Counsels, taking 
nothing for the same”.13 It might be thought that here lies the origin of 
legal aid in England and Wales, but again, that would be wrong, for, as 
Tindall CJ pointed out in Brunt v. Wardle:
14
 
 
“But, after all, is the 11 Hen 7, c12, any thing more than 
confirmatory of the common law? In the learned report of the 
Serjeants‟ case by my brother Manning, p. 41, note (d), a case is 
referred to that occurred in the 15 Ed. 4, twenty years before the 
passing of that act, from which it appears that at common law if a 
party would swear that he could not pay for entering his pleadings, 
the officer was bound to enter them gratis; and that in this court 
there was a presignator pur les poers.” 
 
So, the common law had, at the latest by 1475 in the reign of Edward 
IV, in the midst of the War of the Roses, invented a procedure of relief 
from court fees and costs. Of course, this had nothing to do with Magna 
                                                     
12
 This statute was cited in the Supreme Court of Canada by McLachlin CJ in 
Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) [2014] SCC 59 [48] where she referred to the “long tradition in the 
common law of providing exemptions for classes of people who might be 
prevented from accessing the courts - a tradition that goes back to the Statute of 
Henry VII”. 
13
 A statute had been passed in Scotland in 1424 which provided for free legal 
assistance for “poor creatures” who could not pay costs on account of “default of 
cunning or means”. 
14
 (1841) 3 Man. & G. 534. 
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Carta. It appears that the liability of the loser to pay the costs of the 
winner did not arise until 1531, during the reign of Henry VIII, when 
Parliament passed a statute intituled “An Act that the Defendant shall 
recover costs against the Plaintiff, if the Plaintiff be nonsuited, or if the 
Verdict pass against him”. This initially limited the power to make an 
order for costs to certain specific suits but was extended in the reign of 
James I (4 Jac I, c3) to “any Action whatsoever”. In her excellent speech 
Lady Hale stated: 
 
“A statute of Henry VIII in 1531 even provided that they should 
be relieved of having to pay the other side‟s costs if they lost – but 
they had to suffer some other punishment instead, such as being 
whipped or pilloried.”  
 
In fact the statute did not say that, but rather that they “shall suffer 
other Punishment, as by the Discretion of the Judge or Justices, afore 
whom such suits shall depend, shall be thought reasonable”, and I can find 
no evidence that whipping or pillorying was ordered against unsuccessful 
pauper litigants, however reasonable that might have been then (or even 
now). 
Holdsworth and Lord Sumption ruthlessly hunt down and put to death 
a number of other persistent and obstinate canards. Sir Edward Coke 
suggested that clauses 39 and 40 embodied the principles of habeas corpus 
and trial by jury. As Holdsworth says “It is not difficult to show that taken 
literally, these interpretations are false. Trial by jury was as yet in its 
infancy. The writ of Habeas Corpus was not yet invented; and as we shall 
see, it was long after it was invented that is was applied to protect the 
liberty of the subject.” 
It is noteworthy that as time passed and the Middle Ages evolved into 
the Renaissance, and with the stability and national independence 
provided by the Tudor regime following the defeat of (the recently 
reburied) Richard III at Bosworth in 1485, Magna Carta receded from 
public and legal consciousness, almost into oblivion. By the time of reign 
of Elizabeth I, Gloriana, it had almost disappeared from view, so much so 
that when Shakespeare, her chief propagandist, wrote King John in 1596, 
five years before her death, he did not mention it, or the events 
surrounding it, at all.
15
 On the contrary the whole play concerns the 
dispute about the right to the crown between King John and France‟s 
Philip II (and later his son Louis VIII “the lion”) who supported John‟s 
nephew Arthur. The nearest one gets to baronial disaffection is where they 
                                                     
15
 Inevitably, this is being performed today at the Globe Theatre in London. 
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support Louis (for a while) when he mounts a (now almost totally 
forgotten) invasion. They later revert to their true loyalties; Louis is seen 
off; John is poisoned by a treacherous monk; and on his death-bed his 
nobles gather around him. Dr Goebbels would have been proud of this 
falsification of history. The principal themes of the play were the familiar 
fare dished out to the groundlings at that time: that the French are bad, and 
Catholic monks are worse; and English Kings, even if enduring a 
“troublesome reign”, are top dogs and the real thing (provided they were 
not Plantagenets like Richard III). 
Lord Sumption explains that Coke‟s elevation of Magna Carta into a 
sacred, numinous, text only arose after his dismissal by James I in 1616 as 
Chief Justice of the King‟s Bench as a result of his protests against the 
King‟s interference with the workings of the courts.16 In his retirement he 
transformed it “from a somewhat technical catalogue of feudal 
regulations, into the foundation document of the English constitution, a 
status which it has enjoyed ever since among the large community of 
commentators who have never actually read it.”17 For this the Americans 
bear a heavy responsibility. They adored Magna Carta and relied on it in 
spades to justify their rebellion against the government of George III. Its 
very language is incorporated into the constitutions of about 30 of the 
individual states. 
But when he held office even Coke did not reach for Magna Carta 
when making his momentous decisions. One of the most famous is the 
Proclamations’ Case.18 Coke, then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas 
was asked by the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Treasurer whether King 
James I could by mere proclamation prohibit new buildings in London (an 
early town and country planning measure?) or the making of starch from 
wheat (food standards?). After consulting the Chief Justice of the King‟s 
Bench and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer Coke held: 
                                                     
16
 Following his dismissal in 1616 Coke re-entered politics and was returned as 
MP for Liskeard in 1620. On 11 December 1621 Parliament issued a 
Remonstrance to the King authored by Coke, in which they restated their liberties 
and right to discuss matters of state. James retaliated by dissolving Parliament 
and imprisoning Coke in the Tower for 9 months. He died in 1634. 
17
 It is worth reflecting on the various things that Magna Carta regulated. For 
example, widows were not to be forced to remarry, although if they did they 
needed to ask the King‟s or their lord‟s consent. All fishweirs were to be removed 
from the Thames and elsewhere. No-one was to be forced to build bridges across 
rivers. Alien knights and crossbowmen were to be sent home. All forests which 
had been afforested in John‟s reign were to be deforested. See I Judge and A 
Arlidge, Magna Carta Uncovered (Hart Publishing 2014). 
18
 (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 2 State Tr 723. 
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“the King by his proclamation cannot create any offence which 
was not an offence before, for then he may alter the law of the 
land by his proclamation in a high point; for if he may create an 
offence where none is, upon that ensues fine and imprisonment: 
also the law of England is divided into three parts, common law, 
statute law, and custom; but the King‟s proclamation is none of 
them: also malum aut est malum in se, aut prohibitum, that which 
is against common law is malum in se, malum prohibitum is such 
an offence as is prohibited by Act of Parliament, and not by 
proclamation. Also it was resolved, that the King hath no 
prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.” 
 
No mention of Magna Carta there. 
 
In citing this case in the appeal in Council of Civil Service Unions and 
Others v Minister for the Civil Service
19 (the GCHQ case) Lord Fraser 
stated that “the royal prerogative has always been regarded as part of the 
common law ... and subject to the common law”. No mention there of 
Magna Carta either. 
In the earlier case of Prohibitions Del Roy
20 James I (supported by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury) had claimed to possess the power to determine 
issues of law in Ecclesiastical causes: “the King himself may decide it in 
his Royal person; and that the Judges are but the delegates of the King, 
and that the King may take what causes he shall please to determine, from 
the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himself.” The 
Archbishop said “that this was clear in divinity, that such authority 
belongs to the King by the word of God in the Scripture.” 
Coke was having none of it. He held that “the King in his own person 
cannot adjudge any case, either criminal or betwixt party and party; but it 
ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court of Justice, according 
to the law and custom of England. The King may sit in the King‟s Bench, 
but the Court gives the judgment. No King after the conquest assumed to 
himself to give any judgment in any cause whatsoever which concerned 
the administration of justice, within the realm; but these causes were 
solely determined in the Courts of Justice. The King cannot arrest any 
man.” And he ended his judgment by citing Henry de Bracton: Rex non 
debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege. Again, no mention of Magna 
Carta there. 
                                                     
19
 [1985] AC 374. 
20
 (1607) 12 Co Rep 63. 
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So, we see what Magna Carta does not furnish. It does not newly 
restrain the power of the monarch. It does not establish separation of 
powers. It does not create a representative Parliament. It does not invent 
trial by jury. It does not create habeas corpus. It does not provide a 
forerunner for legal aid (which was not in fact invented in the UK in its 
current form until 1949). In a withering passage Lord Sumption derides 
David Cameron who “armed with a copy of an Edwardian illustrated 
textbook for children, has called it the document that paved the way for 
democracy, equality and the rule of law, the „foundation of all our laws 
and liberties‟”. This sort of claim is, he says, “high-minded tosh...the 
worst kind of ahistorical Whiggism”. 
Lord Sumption ends his paper by asking and answering these two 
questions which reflect his status as a historian of rigour: 
 
“so when we commemorate Magna Carta, perhaps the first 
question that we should ask ourselves is this: do we really need the 
force of myth to sustain our belief in democracy? Do we need to 
derive our belief in democracy and the rule of law from a group of 
muscular conservative millionaires from the north of England, 
who thought in French, knew no Latin or English, and died more 
than three quarters of a millennium ago? I rather hope not.” 
 
But plainly Magna Carta does represent something. Lord Sumption‟s 
view is this: 
 
“Yet Magna Carta matters, if not for the reasons commonly put 
forward. Some documents are less important for what they say 
than for what people wrongly think that they say. Some legislation 
has a symbolic significance quite distinct from any principle 
which it actually enacts. Thus it is with Magna Carta. It has 
become part of the rhetoric of a libertarian tradition based on the 
rule of law that represents a precocious and distinctively English 
contribution to western political theory. The point is that we have 
to stop thinking about it just as a medieval document. It is really a 
chapter in the constitutional history of seventeenth century 
England and eighteenth century America.” 
 
And, indeed, Australia also. 
Holdsworth also sees it as a milestone on the road to freedom. He says 
that “the historian may prove that there is no strict agnatic relationship 
[between trial by jury or the writ of habeas corpus and Magna Carta]; he 
must admit that there is a natural – a cognatic – link”. Blackstone too sees 
MAGNA CARTA AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN FAMILY 
PROCEEDINGS  
 
90 
it as important but not necessarily as the second coming. For him there is 
a steady progression in the promulgation of just laws, the administration 
of justice, and the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. He charts 
a progress from Henry I and the creation of the grand assize and itinerant 
justices of eyre travelling out on circuit to hear cases; to Magna Carta; to 
the summoning of knights, citizens and burgesses to Parliament in the 
reign of Henry III; to the massive programme of law reform instituted by 
Edward I (including reform of the laws of King Alfred for preserving the 
public peace and preventing robberies). For him “the very scheme and 
model of the administration of common justice between party and party, 
was entirely settled by this King; and has continued nearly the same, in all 
succeeding ages, to this day; abating some few alterations, which the 
humour or necessity of subsequent times has occasioned” and “more was 
done in the first thirteen years of his reign to settle and establish the 
distributive justice of the kingdom, than in all the ages since that time put 
together”. He then marks a “long interval” until the Petition of Right, 
assented to by Charles I; the Habeas Corpus Act, passed under Charles II 
in 1679 (31 Cha 2, c2) (new style dating,
21
 as will be all dates hereafter); 
and the Declaration of Rights presented to the Prince and Princess of 
Orange in February 1689 and enacted in December of that year as the Bill 
of Rights following the Glorious Revolution (1 Gul & Mar Sess 2 c2). 
Ironically, the myth took firm hold in the minds of the common 
people, from whom the benefits of the Charter were withheld by design 
for over 100 years. In the famous meditation on the rule of law at the end 
of “Whigs and Hunters”22 (his well known book about the Black Act of 
1723 (9 Geo 1, c22)) the polemical historian, socialist and peacenik E.P. 
Thompson wrote:  
 
“turn where you will, the rhetoric of eighteenth century England is 
saturated with law. Royal absolutism was placed behind a high 
hedge of law … And the rulers were, in serious senses, whether 
willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they 
                                                     
21
 The Calendar (New Style) Act 1750 (otherwise Chesterfield‟s Act) not only 
adopted the Gregorian calendar (and thus abolished the dates 3 – 13 September 
1752) but also fixed the start day of the year as 1 January rather than Lady Day 
(25 March). Thus the Habeas Corpus Act 1679, which was passed between 6 and 
25 March, is dated 1678 in the Statutes at Large. The 1750 Act also means that 
the correct date for the octocentenary, in terms of exact circumsolar orbits, is 26 
June 2015 not 15 June 2015. 
22
 Edward Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (Allen Lane 1975) 263-264; (Breviary 
Stuff Publications 2013) 206, 208. 
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played the games of power according to rules that suited them, but 
they could not break those rules or the whole game would be 
thrown away. And, finally, so far from the ruled shrugging off this 
rhetoric as a hypocrisy, some part of it at least was taken over as 
part of the rhetoric of the plebeian crowd, of the free-born 
Englishman with his inviolable privacy, his habeas corpus, his 
equality before the law. If this rhetoric was a mask, it was a mask 
which John Wilkes was to borrow, at the head of ten thousand 
masked supporters. … If the rhetoric was a mask, it was a mask 
which Ghandi and Nehru were to borrow, at the head of a million 
masked supporters.”23 
 
Magna Carta was referenced by the felon, agitator and minor poet 
John Grant who was sentenced to death, but at the last moment reprieved 
and transported for life to the penal colony of New South Wales in 1804, 
for shooting at a family solicitor who frustrated his attempts to woo the 
daughter of an aristocrat.
24
 In a (not very good) piece of verse he wrote: 
 
“Ye Captains to a Monarch lov‟d rever‟d 
Draw on his head and yours disgrace Down! 
The „Magna Charta‟ our forefather‟s rear‟d 
That brightest jewel in the British Crown 
Ye trample on *! – Tho‟ Britons rule the Waves 
Great George‟s subjects (Britons!) here are Slaves. 
O country beauteous! Climate healthful! mild! 
O George belov‟d (Unlike some Kings) abus‟d! 
O People into Slavery beguil‟d! 
O Rulers guilty of a power misus‟d 
When shall All cry „Britannia rules the Waves 
And Free- born Britons are no longer Slaves‟?”25 
 
And so, recognising that Magna Carta is important, but not nearly as 
important as some commentators make out, but equally recognising it as 
                                                     
23
 But he did not mention Magna Carta in the book. 
24
 He was later pardoned by Macquarie and returned to England in 1811. 
25
 David Neal, The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Politics in Early 
New South Wales (CUP 1990) 61. 
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the mythical fons et origo of the rhetoric of a libertarian evolution based 
on the rule of law I turn, at last, to the subject matter of this address.
26
 
In Ashby v White
27 Ashby, a burgess of Aylesbury, was entitled under 
the borough charter to vote at parliamentary elections. White, a returning 
officer, maliciously refused to allow him to vote. Ashby thereupon sued 
White. Lord Chief Justice Holt (dissenting, but later vindicated by the 
House of Lords) said: 
 
“If the plaintiff has a right he must of necessity have a means to 
vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the 
exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine 
a right without a remedy for want of a right and want of remedy 
are reciprocal. … My brother Powell indeed thinks that an action 
upon the case is not maintainable, because there is no hurt or 
damage to the plaintiff: but surely every injury imports a damage 
though it does not cost the party one farthing, and it is impossible 
to prove the contrary; for a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an 
injury imports a damage, when a man is thereby hindred of his 
right. As in an action for slanderous words, though a man does not 
lose a penny by reason of the speaking them, yet he shall have an 
action. So if a man gives another a cuff on the ear, though it cost 
him nothing, no not so much as a little diachylon,
28
 yet he shall 
have his action, for it is a personal injury ... But in the principal 
case my brother says, we cannot judge of this matter, because it is 
a Parliamentary thing. O! by all means be very tender of that. 
Besides it is intricate, and there may be contrariety of opinions.”29 
 
                                                     
26
 Holdsworth says that “we may compare it to the Twelve Tables [of the Roman 
Republic]. In the same sense as they were regarded as the „fons et origo juris 
civilis’ Magna Carta is the fount and source of our constitutional law”. 
27
 (1702) 2 Ld Raymond 938. 
28
 An 18th C homeopathic medicine made of the juices of several plants (thus its 
name).  
29
 This case roused intense feeling in the Commons, who imagined that the Courts 
were infringing their privileges. They caused Ashby and his counsel to be 
imprisoned, and when these sued out a writ of habeas corpus, they sent the 
Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest Lechmere (afterwards Attorney-General), who had 
acted in the habeas corpus proceedings. The officer reported that Lechmere had 
evaded him: “he got out of his chamber in the Temple, two pairs of stairs high, at 
the back window, by the help of his sheets and a rope”. Queen Anne was forced 
to end the dispute by proroguing Parliament. 
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A remedy can only mean a remedy granted by a court, and that entails 
meaningful access to the court. That right to access to justice has long 
been recognised by the common law (even if for centuries the costs of 
doing so have been prohibitive, and the delays intolerable
30
). In R 
(Witham) v Lord Chancellor Laws LJ stated:
31
 
 
“…the common law provides no lesser protection of the right of 
access to the Queen‟s courts than might be vindicated in 
Strasbourg. … Indeed, the right to a fair trial, which of necessity 
imports the right of access to the court, is as near to an absolute 
right as any which I can envisage.” 
 
His reference to Strasbourg was, of course to Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950) which provides: 
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and liabilities or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial tribunal 
established by law.” 
 
We have seen some early measures designed to alleviate the lot of 
indigent litigants seeking to exercise the right of access to the courts. 
There were further efforts by philanthropic organisations to provide “poor 
man‟s lawyers” during the 19th century but large areas of unmet need were 
left. It was not until the period of the Second World War (when Beveridge 
was beginning his work on the formation of the welfare state) that refugee 
scholars from Europe, with experience of Continental systems where 
better provision was made, began to make a compelling case for a 
comprehensive system of legal aid. In his outstanding book The Rule of 
Law,
32
 Lord Bingham cited Dr EJ Cohn‟s paper Legal Aid for the Poor: A 
study of Comparative Law and Legal Reform
33 where he (Cohn) stated: 
 
“Legal aid is a service which the modern state owes to its citizens 
as a matter of principle. . . . Just as the modern State tries to 
protect the poorer classes against the common dangers of life, such 
                                                     
30
 As to which see Dickens‟s accurate descriptions in Bleak House. When 
delivering his famous “to be or not to be” soliloquy Hamlet cited “the law‟s 
delay” as one of many good reasons for killing himself. 
31
 [1998] QB 575, 585-586 (Laws LJ). 
32
 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010) 87. 
33
 (1943) 59 LQR 250, 253. 
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as unemployment, disease, old age, social oppression, etc, so it 
should protect them when legal difficulties arise. Indeed the case 
for such protection is stronger than the case for any other form of 
protection. The State is not responsible for the outbreak of 
epidemics, for old age or economic crises. But the State is 
responsible for the law.” 
 
These and many other arguments were considered by Lord 
Rushcliffe‟s committee which reported in 1945, and led to the 
introduction of near universal civil legal aid by the Legal Aid and Advice 
Act 1949. It did not apply to defamation proceedings or to some peculiar 
archaic family proceedings, now long abolished (breach of promise; loss 
of services of a woman as a result of seduction; inducement of a spouse to 
leave another). But routine private family law proceedings, whether 
concerning divorce, money or children were within scope. From the start 
this entitlement was subject to means testing. Section 2 provided that it 
should be available to any person whose disposable income did not 
exceed £400 per annum (a very large sum then), but that it may be refused 
if the person had disposable capital of more than £500. 
Legal aid has been described as the fourth pillar of the welfare state, 
the others being health, education and social security. Initially over 80% 
of the population satisfied the means test for civil legal aid; this fell 
progressively so that by 2007 only 27% did. The right to legal aid in 
private law family proceedings was preserved in the Legal Aid Act 1988 
and in the Access to Justice Act 1999. In 2005 the state funded about 
45,000 such cases at a cost of about £130m. 
I have mentioned above Art 6(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. There have been decisions from the Strasbourg court 
which have interpreted that provision to say that in some complex, 
exceptional, cases this requires the grant of legal aid, even if no scheme 
exists for the matter in hand: see, for example, Airey v Ireland
34
 (no legal 
aid was available for judicial separation proceedings in the Republic of 
Ireland) and Steel and Morris v United Kingdom
35 (the “McLibel” case, 
where no legal aid was available in the UK for defamation proceedings). 
In the latter case the Strasbourg Court found at para 72 that the denial of 
legal aid to the applicants deprived them of the opportunity to present 
their case effectively before the court and contributed to an unacceptable 
inequality of arms. The human right to legal aid has been taken further by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (30 March 
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 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305. 
35
 (2005) 41 EHRR 22. 
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2010), which certainly applies in the UK where EU law is in play, and 
may well apply more generally.
36
 Art 47 provides: 
 
“Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the 
Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
Article.  
 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility 
of being advised, defended and represented.  
 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient 
resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
access to justice.” 
 
Unfortunately, the cost of the legal aid scheme was its undoing. By 
1997 it was the fastest rising item of government expenditure. It was 
inevitable that following the crash of 2008 and with the election of the 
new austerity-driven coalition government in 2010 that serious curbs on 
the scheme would be imposed. What no-one anticipated was the savagery 
of the cuts, with private family law proceedings, save in certain very 
limited circumstances, being taken out of scope altogether. 
In November 2010 the new coalition government published its 
consultation paper Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and 
Wales. In its foreword the then Lord Chancellor wrote of “achieving 
substantial savings” to reduce the fiscal deficit and to return the country‟s 
economy to stability and growth. In its body the government wrote about 
making “tough decisions about where best to target resources”. It stated at 
para 4.67 its belief that “legal aid is not routinely justified for ancillary 
relief proceedings and private law family and children proceeding”. In 
para 4.207 it stated: 
 
“While we understand that those going through relationship 
breakdown may be dealing with a difficult situation, both 
emotionally and often practically too, we do not consider that this 
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 The scope of the applicability of the Charter is legally complex and is beyond 
the remit of this paper. 
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means that the parents bringing these cases are always likely to be 
particularly vulnerable (compared with detained mental health 
patients, or elderly care home residents, for example), or that their 
emotional involvement in the case will necessarily mean that they 
are unable to present it themselves. There is no reason to believe 
that such cases will be routinely legally complex.” 
 
The government‟s own equality impact statement accepted that the 
proposals would have a disproportionate impact upon women, ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities. They said that it was justifiable 
because they are disproportionate users of the service in these areas. This 
led the Legal Action Group to suggest that “this would lead to an 
underclass of people disenfranchised from civil justice and indifferent to 
the rule of law”. Notwithstanding these objections the government‟s 
proposals were enacted with very few changes in the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), which came 
into force on 1 April 2013. It removed legal aid from private law children 
proceedings save in those exceptional cases where domestic violence is a 
central feature. In such a case the alleged victim, but not the alleged 
perpetrator, might receive legal aid. Otherwise, at a stroke, 63 years of 
state funding of private family law cases was swept away. Since then the 
courts have been flooded with Litigants in Person. Lists of 12 cases which 
used to be completed in a day are now a far gone memory. 
In my own decision of MG & JG v JF
37
 I set out, with as much self-
restraint as I could muster, the catalogue of cases that had arisen where the 
judges had commented on the gross injustice being meted out as a result 
of these reforms. I stated (and I do not apologise for a rather extensive 
quotation): 
 
“15. Since the reforms have taken effect there have been an 
appreciable number of cases which have demonstrated that the 
blithe assumption in the consultation paper (that the parties‟ 
emotional involvement in the case will not necessarily mean that 
they are unable to present it themselves, and that there is no reason 
to believe that such cases will be routinely legally complex) is 
unfounded. This was entirely predictable. The cases are Kinderis v 
Kineriene [2013] EWHC 4139 (Fam) (18 December 2013, 
Holman J); Re B (a child) (private law fact finding - unrepresented 
father) [2014] EWHC 700 (Fam) (27 January 2014, Judge 
Wildblood QC); Q v Q [2014] EWFC 7 (21 May 2014, the 
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THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
97 
President); Q v Q (No. 2), Re B, Re C [2014] EWFC 31 (6 August 
2014, the President); Re H [2014] EWFC B127 (14 August 2014, 
Judge Hallam); Re D (A Child) [2014] EWFC 39 (31 October 
2014, the President); CD v ED [2014] EWFC B153 (14 November 
2014, Judge Hudson); Re D (A Child) (No. 2) [2015] EWFC 2 (7 
January 2015, the President); and Re K & H (Children: 
Unrepresented Father: Cross-Examination of Child) [2015] 
EWFC 1 (5 January 2015, Judge Bellamy). This is a formidable 
catalogue. Each case focussed on the gross unfairness meted out to 
a parent in private law proceedings by the denial of legal aid. I do 
not think it would be right to say that these were examples of the 
operation of the law of unintended consequences since, as I say, 
the problems were so entirely predictable.” 
 
I went on to say: 
 
18. I need only cite a few of the judicial observations. In Kinderis 
v Kineriene Holman J described the position in which the 
unrepresented mother in Hague proceedings found herself as 
follows:  
 
“the present procedure operates in a way which is unjust, contrary 
to the welfare of particularly vulnerable children at a time of great 
upheaval in their lives, incompatible with the obligations of this 
state under Article 11(3) of the [B2R] regulation, and ultimately 
counter-productive in that it merely wastes taxpayers‟ funds”  
 
In Re H Judge Hallam was dealing with an unrepresented mother 
with speech, hearing and learning difficulties. An official of the 
Legal Aid Agency stated that there would be no breach of 
convention rights were she to remain unfunded. Judge Hallam 
stated “I find that statement astounding”. In Re D the 
unrepresented father, who lacked capacity, had made an 
application to revoke a care order; the local authority had applied 
for a placement (for adoption) order. After heavy pressure from 
the President some legal aid was eventually awarded. At para 
31(vi) of his first judgment the President stated:  
 
“thus far the State has simply washed its hands of the problem, 
leaving the solution to the problem which the State itself has 
created – for the State has brought the proceedings but declined all 
responsibility for ensuring that the parents are able to participate 
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effectively in the proceedings it has brought – to the goodwill, the 
charity, of the legal profession. This is, it might be thought, both 
unprincipled and unconscionable. Why should the State leave it to 
private individuals to ensure that the State is not in breach of the 
State‟s – the United Kingdom‟s – obligations under the 
Convention?” At para 21 of his second judgment he stated that 
“the parents can be forgiven for thinking that they are trapped in a 
system which is neither compassionate nor even humane”. 
 
19. In Lindner v Rawlins [2015] EWCA Civ 61 at para 34 Aikens 
LJ stated: 
 
“Yet again, the court was without any legal assistance and had to 
spend time researching the law for itself then attempting to apply 
it to the relevant facts in order to arrive at the correct legal answer. 
To do the latter exercise meant that the court itself had to trawl 
through a large amount of documents in the file. All this involves 
an expensive use of judicial time, which is in short supply as it is. 
Money may have been saved from the legal aid funds, but an equal 
amount of expense, if not more, has been incurred in terms of the 
costs of judges‟ and court time. The result is that there is, in fact, 
no economy at all. Worse, this way of dealing with cases runs the 
risk that a correct result will not be reached because the court does 
not have the legal assistance of counsel that it should have and the 
court has no other legal assistance available to it.”  
 
20. These are powerful criticisms. The President suggested that if 
the Legal Aid Agency would not award legal aid to an 
unrepresented parent facing serious allegations then the court 
might have to do so from its own budget. In Re K & H that was the 
course proposed. The Lord Chancellor instructed leading counsel 
who bravely argued that the President‟s analysis of the existence 
of this power was „plainly wrong‟. Judge Bellamy disagreed and 
awarded representation from the court budget. The Lord 
Chancellor is appealing that decision. It can safely be assumed that 
the criticisms I have recounted have fallen on deaf ears. Based on 
the decisions I have cited, including no fewer than four from the 
President himself, it can be said that in the field of private children 
law the principle of individual justice has had to be sacrificed on 
the altar of the public debt. And based on the observation of 
Aikens LJ, it can reasonably be predicted that the phenomenon of 
the massive increase in self-representation will give rise to the 
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serious risk of the court reaching incorrect, and therefore unjust, 
decisions.” 
 
I think that my views can be clearly gathered from what I have said in 
that judgment. The most acute problems arise in the situation illustrated 
by the cases of Q v Q (No. 2); Re B; Re C,
38
 and Re K & H.
39
 In each case 
the unrepresented father, who was seeking contact to his child(ren), was 
accused in private law proceedings of terrible sexual misconduct. For 
example, in Re B and Re C he was accused of raping the mother and in Re 
K & H he was accused of sexually molesting his 17 year old step-
daughter. Obviously findings in relation to these allegations would be 
central to any determination of the contact issue. In the absence of legal 
aid the court faced the prospect of the unrepresented father cross-
examining the complainant directly. That would be unthinkable in a 
criminal case (although not in the USA where the old right to confront 
your accusers is embedded in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution), 
and could not happen in a public law (i.e. child protection) case where non 
merits based, non means tested legal aid is still afforded. The President 
held, obiter, that in such a circumstance the court itself could award legal 
representation to the accused father from its own budget and such an order 
was actually made in Re K & H, although it has very recently been 
overturned on appeal (22 May 2015). Lord Dyson MR held:
40
 
 
“I do not consider that it is possible to interpret either section 1 of 
the Courts Act 2003 or section 31G(6) of Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 as giving the court the power to require the 
Lord Chancellor to provide funding for legal representation in 
circumstances where such funding is not available under a scheme 
as detailed and comprehensive as that which has been set up under 
LASPO. The court must respect the boundaries drawn by 
Parliament for public funding of legal representation. In my view, 
the interpretation adopted by the judge is impermissible: it 
amounts to judicial legislation.” 
 
The Master of the Rolls held that it was perfectly acceptable for a 
judge to act as crossexaminer where a party is unrepresented (see paras 58 
– 60). However, he accepted at para 62 that a case might arise where there 
were complex facts or issues of expert evidence (unlike the case in hand 
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 [2015] EWCA Civ 543 [31] (Lord Dyson). 
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which he described as “fairly straightforward”) where a breach of Articles 
6 and/or 8 of the ECHR might arise were representation not to be made 
available; and he suggested that legislation be passed to remedy the 
problem. He left tantalisingly open the position were legislation not to be 
passed and such complexities to arise in a future case (as they surely will). 
Parliamentarians have also been strongly critical of the legal aid cuts. 
The report of the House of Commons Justice Select Committee dated 12 
March 2015
41
 on the impact of changes to civil legal aid under LASPO 
regretted the Government‟s failure to carry out adequate research into the 
legal aid system before introducing the reforms. It recorded that the 
Ministry of Justice “is on track to exceed spending reduction forecasts by 
£32 million because, following the reforms, the Legal Aid Agency is 
funding fewer matters than it had anticipated”. It found that the 
exceptional cases funding scheme has not done the job Parliament 
intended namely “protecting access to justice for the most vulnerable 
people in our society”. It heard ample evidence that legal aid is not 
reaching many of those eligible for it. It found that the rise in litigants in 
person constitutes at least some people who struggle to present their cases 
effectively, whether due to inarticulacy, poor education, lack of 
confidence, learning difficulties or other barriers to successful 
engagement with the court process. The evidence showed that the legal 
aid changes focused disproportionately on the crisis point of some cases 
and failed to appreciate the costs saving inherent in resolving disputes 
before they arrive at court. Its fundamental conclusion was that the faulty 
implementation of the legal aid changes contained in LASPO has harmed 
access to justice for some litigants. 
Similarly critical was the report of the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Joint Committee dated 24 March 2015
42
 on the UK‟s compliance with the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It recorded a National Audit 
Office report on the impact of LASPO on civil legal aid changes which 
found a 22% rise in the number of private family law cases involving 
children where neither party was represented and a corresponding fall in 
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 House of Commons Justice Committee, „Impact of Changes to Civil Legal Aid 
Under Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012‟ HC (2014-15)  
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 Joint Committee on Human Rights, „the UK‟s Compliance with the UN 
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those where both were represented. It stated that “on the basis that cases 
involving litigants in person take an average of 50% longer, it estimates 
an additional £3 million cost in family court cases had resulted from 
LASPO”. It concluded: “THE GOVERNMENT‟S REFORMS TO 
LEGAL AID HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT BLACK MARK ON ITS 
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THIS 
PARLIAMENT” (Upper case in original). 
Senior retired judges have also joined the chorus of criticism. In a 
speech to legal aid lawyers on 22 April 2015, delivered shortly before the 
general election on 7 May 2015, Sir Alan Moses, the former Court of 
Appeal judge, stated: 
 
“No one seems to care about the plight of those who have neither 
the ability to protect themselves in a legal sense and cannot afford 
a lawyer (sic).  
 
That [people] are deprived of the chance of legal aid seems to 
figure at the very bottom of concern in this election. No one thinks 
they are ever going to be faced with circumstances that require 
someone to hold their hand and safeguard them in the frightening 
and alienating circumstances of a court of law.  
 
Who cares about the prisoner whose rights are abused and needs 
legal advice and assistance? Who cares about the immigrant who 
asserts they are a genuine refugee? Those who cannot afford 
access to the courts are often the unpopular minorities and there 
are no votes in helping them.”43 
 
The retired appeal judge Sir Anthony Hooper went even further at the 
meeting, stating (probably unscripted and ex tempore):  
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 Owen Bowcott, „senior Judge: Politicians are Ignoring Harm Caused by Cuts to 
Legal System‟ (The Guardian, 23 April 2015)  
<www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/23/sir-alan-moses-politicians-ignoring-
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can do something by speaking in the background but we never know what‟s been 
said. I‟m confident that the judges are very concerned about cuts to legal aid – 
and that it‟s very inefficient.” 
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“I‟m completely depressed. I started out in the legal profession 30-
odd years ago when we had as Rolls-Royce a system as you 
possibly could have. This has been destroyed gradually and then 
quickly over the past few years. Whatever we have said it‟s not 
made any difference at all. If the Conservatives come back into 
power, it‟s revolution time. We have to stop helping them and stop 
working. The Bar Council are not going to do anything. The Law 
Society is not going to do anything. The judges are not going to do 
anything. Unless you [lawyers] are prepared to withdraw your 
labour you have no hope. If the Tories get back in, they haven‟t 
even started on us.” 
 
Sir Alan and Sir Anthony, along with a further 136 prominent peers, 
lawyers and doctors working in the civil and criminal justice systems 
signed an open letter to the Guardian on 1 May 2015 calling on the 
incoming government to restore legal aid to prevent “widespread 
miscarriages of justice”.44 In it they pointed out that in 2010, annual 
expenditure for the civil and criminal justice system stood at 
approximately £2bn per annum, which equates to the cost of running the 
NHS for a fortnight. Spending was falling and was not spiralling out of 
control. Now the level of spending is down to approximately £1.5bn per 
annum. The effect of the cuts is reflected in “eye-watering statistics”. 
From 2012-13 to 2013-14, funded debt cases fell from 81,792 to 2,423; in 
clinical negligence from 2,859 to 114; in employment law from 16,154 to 
six. Funding in family law cases dropped by 60%, causing a predicted rise 
in unrepresented defendants, a trend now also starting to be seen in the 
criminal courts. 
They went on to say: 
 
“What the figures do not convey is the sheer human misery of 
being unable to get legal advice. … With cuts and debilitating 
                                                     
44
 Other signatories included retired Appeal Court judge Sir Stephen Sedley, 
visiting professor at Oxford University; Lord Ramsbotham, the army general who 
became HM chief inspector of prisons; Lord Carlile QC, the former Liberal 
Democrat MP and one-time independent reviewer of terrorist legislation; 
Baroness Ruth Lister, professor of social policy at Loughborough University; 
Frances Crook, chief executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform; Shami 
Chakrabarti, director of Liberty; Baroness Helena Kennedy QC; Sir Geoffrey 
Bindman QC; and Michael Mansfield QC.  
See „Legal Aid Cuts Threaten Our Very Democracy‟ (The Guardian, 1 May 
2015) <www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/01/legal-aid-cuts-threaten-very-
democracy> accessed 26 August 2015. 
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restructuring comes the spectre of advice deserts, widespread 
miscarriages of justice, hundreds of thousands denied redress and 
the draining of the talent pool of future lawyers and judges as 
young people increasingly choose a career away from civil and 
criminal law. … Politicians speak about access to justice as an 
optional extra that we simply cannot afford. But the introduction 
of legal aid, replacing the ad hoc „poor law‟ scheme of the 1920s 
and 1930s, came during a period of true austerity in the wake of 
the Second World War. Access to justice is more than just a public 
good which we can choose to fund generously when we are told 
our economic fortunes allow. Without access to justice for all, 
inequalities take on a more dangerous edge which threatens the 
legitimacy of not just the justice system but our democracy.” 
 
They called on the new government to restore legal help to the many 
currently without redress and to establish a Royal Commission to 
investigate the current crisis regarding the diminution of access to justice. 
Even allowing for the need to make cuts in order to reduce the fiscal 
deficit I do not accept that in the critically important area of private family 
law it has been necessary to sacrifice individual justice on the altar of the 
public debt, at least not to the extent that has happened. It is not clear to 
me why this particular pillar of the welfare state has had to fall. I have yet 
to hear a convincing riposte to Dr Cohn‟s argument cited above, which 
has, until recently, been part of the bedrock of the post-war settlement. 
The prediction of the Legal Action Group is slowly but surely being 
fulfilled. Is this the legacy that we wish to leave future generations? Sadly 
it looks as though that will be so, and there will be no respite from further 
cuts. Apart from the Greens no party included a reversal or mitigation of 
the legal aid cuts in its election manifesto. The unexpected victory and 
attainment of an absolute majority by the Conservatives on 7 May 2015 
surely means that there is no prospect of reversal of these cuts, and that 
more are in prospect. 
Thus far my address has been exclusively Anglo-centric, for which I 
apologise. I gather that things here in Australia are no better. I am 
indebted to Dr David Neal SC and David Hillard who have educated me 
on the position here, but I would not presume to dilate on it, let alone to 
criticise it. You know the position far better than I do. 
It is perhaps an irony that for many years Australian legal aid 
campaigners held up the UK legal aid system as a model. From inception 
it was a system which provided aid across the board in criminal, family 
and civil matters at rates which made it economically viable for lawyers to 
work on legally aided cases. As I have shown, the UK government, until 
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the arrival of the coalition in 2010, had been committed to providing 
levels of funding which reflected a genuine commitment to the principle 
of equality before the law. I am told that the modern era of legal aid in 
Australia – which dates from the Whitlam government of 1972 - has never 
seen either the breadth of coverage or the level of funding to match the 
UK legal aid system.
45
 The first decade of the 2000s saw legal aid 
commissions progressively reduce grants of legal aid in order to stay 
within their tightly constrained budgets. They have increasingly imposed 
means tests, merits tests, quotas, and have taken legal areas out of scope. 
David Hillard tells me that now legal aid funding is $20m p.a. less than it 
was in 1997.
46
 I gather that in five of the eight States and Territories, the 
means test for a grant of legal aid excludes some people who fall below 
the commonly accepted “Henderson Poverty Line”.47 I gather that in this 
state the income limit is 52.4% of the minimum weekly wage. I gather 
that only 8% of households would qualify for contribution free legal aid 
and that only a further 3% would qualify for a grant with a contribution. 
Based on research done by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2009, total 
Australian government spending on legal aid commissions came to $28 
per capita. By contrast, the UK government spent $86 on legal aid.
48
 By 
2012, the UK figure had dropped back to $60 per capita.
49
 I gather that in 
Victoria a parent in a private family law residence and contact dispute will 
not be granted legal aid for representation unless the other party has a 
lawyer. That is bad, but at least it is an improvement on what is happening 
now in England and Wales. I gather that children under 10 will no longer 
have someone to represent them in child protection cases even when the 
court says they should. That is even worse than the position in England 
and Wales.
50
 I gather that a recent agreement thrashed out in Canberra 
concerning the funding of community legal centres will impose further 
                                                     
45
 David Neal, „Law and Power: Livin‟ in the „70s‟ (2013) 29 Law in Context 99. 
46
 This figure has not been adjusted for inflation. You have $20m less in 1997 
dollars. 
47
 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Legal Aid Funding: Current Challenges and the 
Opportunities of Cooperative Federalism (2009) 36. 
48
 ibid 59-60. 
49
 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), „Report on 
European Judicial Systems – Edition 2014 (2012 data): Efficiency and Quality of 
Justice‟ 
<http://www.coe.int./t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/rapport_2014_en.
pdf> accessed 26 August 2015, 46. 
50
 „Legal Aid Matters‟ (Law Institute Victoria) <http://www.liv.asn.au/For-
Lawyers/Submissions-and-LIV-projects/Legal-Aid-Matters> accessed 26 August 
2015. 
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swinging cuts: it will fall from $42m annually to $30m. A depressing 
harbinger indeed. 
Although Australia has not yet suffered the full extent of the dramatic 
cuts imposed in 2013 in the UK, the writing is clearly on the wall here. 
The declining commitment of governments in both countries to genuine 
equality before the law and to the cluster of rule of law concepts – of 
which Magna Carta forms a significant part – should put a brake on 
meretricious rhetoric and produce calls for fidelity to the ideals which 
they both claim. 
Let me end with the words of Sir Alan Moses in the speech from 
which I have already quoted: 
 
“so let me suggest a measurement for the success of our society 
and democracy, so happily ignored by those who seek majority 
support. It is how we deal with and protect our unpopular 
minorities. Democracy even during an election is not about the 
will of the majority but about how the voiceless minority - those 
who are unprotected and without legal assistance – are protected 
against power: the power of the majority and the power of those 
who govern us.” 
